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Abstract
We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are sym-
metric with respect to material payo¤s but in which not all players seek to maximize
their material payo¤s. Speci…cally, a subset of players have negatively interdependent
preferences and care not only about their own material payo¤s but also about their
payo¤s relative to others. We identify su¢cient conditions under which members of
the latter group have a strategic advantage in the following sense: at all intragroup
symmetric equilibria of the game, they earn strictly higher material payo¤s than do
players who seek to maximize their material payo¤s. We show that these conditions are
satis…ed by a number of games of economic importance, and discuss the implications
of these …ndings for the evolutionary theory of preference formation and the theory of
Cournot competition.
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A fundamental ingredient of most economic models is the hypothesis of independent prefer-
ences: agents choose their actions with the sole purpose of maximizing their own material
payo¤s regardless of how their actions a¤ect the payo¤s of other individuals. While this
postulate is seldom given explicit justi…cation, it appears to be based on the intuition that
those individuals who are willing to make material sacri…ces to a¤ect the payo¤s of others
will lose wealth relative to those who are unwilling to do so, with the eventual consequence
that the latter will come to dominate the economy. In this case, the maximization of one’s
own material payo¤s would simply be a pre-condition for survival in an environment where
a competitive selection process is at work. While this intuition may be persuasive in the
context of perfectly competitive environments, it can be seriously misleading when applied
to strategic settings, for it is not generally true in such environments that agents who pur-
sue the maximization of their own material payo¤s will obtain higher material payo¤s in
equilibrium than symmetrically placed individuals who maximize other objective functions.
Indeed, at least in some strategic environments, the reverse may be true.
This last point has been demonstrated in the literature mostly by means of particular
speci…cations of Cournot oligopoly models. For instance, Vickers (1984) and Fershtman and
Judd (1987) have shown in the context of such models (with linear demand and cost func-
tions) that a …rm whose objective function gives a positive weight to its relative pro…ts or
sales will outperform the absolute pro…t maximizers in terms of absolute pro…ts. It can also
be shown that similar results obtain in some other strategic environments, such as common
pool resource and public good games (Koçkesen et al., 1997), in which agents with negatively
interdependent preferences (that is, those who care about both absolute and relative pay-
o¤s) may well obtain greater absolute payo¤s in equilibrium than do symmetrically placed
absolute payo¤ maximizers. In such environments, interdependent preferences may be said
to yield a strategic advantage to those who possess them.
While it is useful to know that interdependent preferences yield a strategic advantage
in the particular examples that have been considered in the literature to date, it is di¢cult
to judge the broader signi…cance of such …ndings without some assessment of the extent
to which such results can be generalized. Our purpose in this paper is to provide a fairly
general analysis of the issue, and to show that the cases in which negatively interdependent
preferences yield an unambiguous strategic advantage over independent preferences are far
more common than one might at …rst expect. We consider the general classes of supermod-
ular and submodular games in which only a subset of players have independent objective
functions whereas the rest have negatively interdependent preferences. Informally stated, we
identify several sets of su¢cient conditions under which the members of the latter group have
a strategic advantage in the following sense: at all intragroup symmetric equilibria, the in-
2terdependent individuals earn higher material payo¤s than do players who seek to maximize
their own material payo¤s. We also show that there are simple symmetric games in which
players with independent preferences unambiguously outperform those with interdependent
preferences in terms of absolute payo¤s.
These …ndings may be considered interesting in their own right, since they relate the
familiar notions of strategic complementarities and substitutabilities to the possibility that
an envious concern with the payo¤s of others may lead one to have greater absolute payo¤s
in equilibrium than those obtained by (absolute) payo¤ maximizers. Moreover, these results
achieve a useful level of generality, for it turns out that our su¢ciency conditions are satis…ed
by a number of games which play central roles in various branches of economic theory,
including the Cournot oligopoly, input and public good games, search models and arms
races.
The main …ndings of this paper …nd immediate application in at least two contexts.
Our …rst application concerns the theory of preference formation. Evolutionary models of
preference formation are typically based on the assumption that the selection dynamics are
payo¤ monotonic: the population share of those endowed with preferences that are more
highly rewarded materially increases relative to the population share of those who are less
highly rewarded (see, among others, Rogers, 1994, Bergstrom, 1995 and Robson, 1996). In
the presence of such payo¤ monotonic selection dynamics, our results enable us to identify
the evolutionary stability properties of absolute payo¤ maximizing behavior. Speci…cally,
with respect to the economic environments studied here, we are able to show that the long
run population composition cannot be a monomorphic one composed only of absolute payo¤
maximizers. While this does not preclude the persistent presence of independent agents
in the population, it calls into question the common practice of modeling economic agents
exclusively as absolute payo¤ maximizers.
Secondly, our …ndings have some interesting implications for the analysis of oligopolistic
industries. This stems from the fact that executive managers may in some circumstances
either choose or be given incentives by owners to incorporate relative pro…t (or market share)
concerns into their decision making. For example, when shareholders cannot calculate the
potential pro…ts of the …rm under di¤erent action choices, managers may well seek to occupy
a higher rank in the industry distribution of pro…ts so as to demonstrate their success.
Alternatively, as advanced by several authors, there may exist informational reasons for
owners to provide incentives to their managers that cause the latter to be concerned with
the …rm’s performance relative to those of similarly situated competing …rms. In particular, if
managers’ e¤orts are unobservable by owners and there is some common uncertainty a¤ecting
all …rms in the industry, owners may bene…t from making their managers’ compensation
contingent upon relative as well as absolute pro…ts (Holmström, 1982, and Nalebu¤ and
3Stiglitz, 1983). As a corollary of our results, we …nd here that such contracts may yield an
unplanned strategic advantage to a …rm in terms of its absolute pro…ts. Since this advantage
is not based on technological or marketing superiority, it helps provide a novel explanation
for the evident inequality of market shares even in industries which are composed of …rms
operating with very similar technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our general framework and
formalize the nature of the present inquiry. Section 3 contains our main results which iden-
tify certain classes of supermodular and submodular games in which interdependent agents
have a strategic advantage over independent agents in all intragroup symmetric equilibria.
Examples of several commonly studied games that belong to these classes are also presented
in this section. Finally, in Section 4 we elaborate on the implications of our main …ndings for
the theories of preference formation and Cournot competition. We conclude with a discussion
of directions for future research, and an appendix containing the proofs of our results.
2 The Framework
Since our ultimate aim is to compare the performances of di¤erent preference structures in
terms of monetary outcomes, we shall concentrate on games in strategic form in which no
player has an a priori advantage in terms of the primitives of the game. Consequently, our
focus will be exclusively on symmetric games. Given any integers n > 2 and ` > 1; we let ¡
stand for a symmetric n-person normal form game with an `-dimensional action space. That
is,
¡ = (X;f¼rgr=1;:::;n)
where X µ R` and ¼r : Xn ! R are the action space and the absolute payo¤ function of
player r; and where we have
¼r(x1;:::;xn) = ¼¾(r)(x¾(1);:::;x¾(n)) 8xr 2 X and r = 1;:::;n (1)
for any swap operator ¾ on f1;:::;ng:1 As is usually done in applied and experimental game
theory, we interpret ¼r as the material payo¤ function of player r: Moreover, we assume that
¡ satis…es the following nonnegativity conditions:
¼r(x) > 0 8x 2 X
n and r = 1;:::;n: (2)
These conditions allow us interpret the notion of “relative payo¤s” in the usual sense.2
Finally, we denote the class of all ¡ that satisfy (2) by G, and let N(¡) stand for the set of
1A swap operator ¾ on f1;:::;ng is a permutation on f1;:::;ng such that jfr : ¾(r) 6= rgj = 2:
2When ¼r is bounded from below, the requirement in (2) is not restrictive. For by adding jinfx2X ¼r(x)j
to ¼r, we obtain a new game which satis…es (2) and which is strategically equivalent to the original game;
see the examples given in Section 3.3.
4all Nash equilibria of ¡ 2 G.
In what follows, we endow R` with a partial order % to obtain an ordered vector space.3
In fact, we shall often take X to be a chain, i.e., assume that % linearly (completely) orders
X. We note that the linearity of the order % does not turn out to be demanding as a
structural assumption in many applications. Indeed, in numerous economic contexts ` is
taken to be 1; i.e. X µ R; in which case there is a natural linear order on X: Therefore,
insofar as such games are concerned, the assumption that X is completely ordered is without
loss of generality. On the other hand, when ` > 1; depending on the economic context, one
may linearly order X by means of any completion of the coordinatewise ordering such as the
lexicographic, leximin or leximax orderings.
Throughout this paper we assume that the set of players consists of two di¤erent types,
namely, independent and (negatively) interdependent players. The independent players are
those who are absolute payo¤ maximizers in the usual sense; the objective function of an
independent player i is precisely her own monetary payo¤ function ¼i: On the other hand,
(negatively) interdependent players are concerned not only with their absolute payo¤s, but





¼r denote the average (absolute) payo¤ function on Xn, and de…ne the relative







; if ¼j > 0
0; if ¼j = 0:
The objective function of an interdependent player j is given by x 7! F(¼j;½j) where F
is an arbitrary strictly increasing real function on R2
+: This particular way of representing
negatively interdependent preferences has recently been proposed and axiomatically char-
acterized by Ok and Koçkesen (1997). In particular, when ¡ is played between individuals
(as opposed to, say, …rms), the preferences represented in this form can be interpreted as a
compromise between the standard case where one is assumed to care only about her mone-
tary earnings ¼j, and the extreme case where she is concerned exclusively with her relative
payo¤ in the game, i.e., with ½j (the latter case corresponds to Duesenberry’s relative income
hypothesis.)5 If, on the other hand, ¡ is an oligopoly game, then an interdependent player
3A partial order % on R` is a relation on R` which is re‡exive, transitive and antisymmetric. (As usual,
we write Â for % n =.) We say that (R`;%) is an ordered vector (or Riesz) space; if % is a partial order,
and if, for any x;y 2 R` with x % y; we have x + z % y + z and ¸x % ¸y for all z 2 R` and ¸ > 0:
4We use the convention of setting ½j(x) = 0 whenever ¼j(x) = 0 to avoid the di¢culty of evaluating the
indeterminate form 0=0:
5Special cases of this representation of interdependent preferences are utilized in numerous economic
contexts ranging from models of optimal income taxation to experimental bargaining games. We refer the
reader to the references cited in Ok and Koçkesen (1997) and Koçkesen et al. (1997).
5with such an objective function can be thought of as a …rm (or manager) who targets the
maximization of not only its pro…ts but also its pro…t share in the industry.
Let us then assume that precisely k 2 f1;:::;n¡1g many players in ¡ 2 G areindependent.







¼r; if r 2 Ik
F (¼r;½r); if r 2 Jk
(3)
where
Ik ´ f1;:::;kg and Jk ´ fk + 1;:::;ng;
and F : R2
+ ! R is any strictly increasing function.6 Clearly, in ¡F(k); the set of all
independent players is Ik; and the set of all interdependent players is Jk: (By de…nition,
there are jIkj = k many independent players, and jJkj = n¡k many interdependent players
in ¡F(k).) The crucial interpretation is that, while we only observe the payo¤s associated
with the game ¡ as outsiders, the associated players actually engage in playing ¡F(k) instead
of ¡:
In this paper, we wish to analyze the nature of Nash equilibrium of an arbitrary ¡F(k):
However, it must be noted at the outset that there are two immediate di¢culties that
we shall often assume away in the general analysis that follows. First, the existence of a
Nash equilibrium of ¡F(k) is rather di¢cult to establish in general. Even if we posit the
standard requirement of quasiconcavity of ¼r in xr for all r (along with continuity of ¼r;
and compactness and convexity of X), the payo¤ function pj; j 2 Jk; need not inherit this
property. Even the deeper existence theorems established in the literature (such as those of
Topkis, 1979, Nishimura and Friedman, 1981, and Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986) are generally
not helpful in settling this existence problem. It appears that the best strategy at this stage
is to ignore this problem, and search for some qualitative properties of the equilibria of
¡F(k); when it exists. In fact, in many examples of economic interest (such as Cournot and
Bertrand oligopolies, common pool resource and public good games, arms races, etc.) one
can directly verify that the set of equilibria of ¡F(k) is nonempty, and hence our line of
attack turns out to be fruitful.
The second di¢culty is the analytical intractability of certain non–symmetric equilibria
of an arbitrary ¡F(k). The analysis is greatly simpli…ed when we focus instead on the
6As the proofs given in the appendix will readily reveal, our entire development remains intact if each pj
was de…ned in terms of a strictly increasing Fj for all j 2 Jk where Fj1 6= Fj2 was allowed for any j1 6= j2:
6intragroup symmetric Nash equilibria of a given game ¡F(k); denoted Nsym(¡F(k));
which is de…ned as
Nsym(¡F(k)) ´ f([a]k;[b]n¡k) 2 N(¡F(k)) : a;b 2 Xg
where [t]l denotes the l¡replication of the object t.7 One could, of course, advance a
“focal point” argument to justify interest in Nsym(¡F(k)): Perhaps more importantly, we
shall observe that in most of the economic examples considered below, we actually have
N(¡F(k)) = Nsym(¡F(k)) so a focus on intragroup symmetric equilibria is unrestrictive.
This is trivially the case in all two person games.
Finally, let us clarify what we mean by “studying the nature of Nsym(¡F(k))” given a
¡ 2 G. Put precisely, we are interested in identifying some general subclasses of G where
interdependent players have a de…nite strategic advantage over the independent players in
terms of monetary payo¤s, that is, where
¼j(^ x) > ¼i(^ x) 8(i;j) 2 Ik £Jk and ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(k)): (4)
There are several concrete economic motivations behind this inquiry as already hinted in
the previous section. Indeed, whether or not interdependent players (who do not directly
maximize their absolute payo¤s) obtain higher (or strictly higher) absolute payo¤s than all
independent players (who do target the maximization of their absolute payo¤s) is a question
of great interest in evolutionary theories of preference formation. The same inquiry also turns
out to be quite relevant with respect to some recent approaches in oligopoly theory where
the distinction between managerial incentives and the objectives of the …rm is explicitly




An n-person normal formgame ¡ 2 G issaid to be supermodular wheneverX isa sublattice
of R` and
¼r(x _ y) + ¼r(x ^ y) > ¼r(x) + ¼r(y) 8x;y 2 X
n and r = 1;:::;n,
7By an immediate application of the symmetry condition (1) we have
¼i1(^ x) = ¼i2(^ x) 8i1;i2 2 Ik; and ¼j1(^ x) = ¼j2(^ x) 8j1;j2 2 Jk
whenever ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(k)); this observation will prove extremely useful in what follows.
7where x _ y is the lowest upper bound of fx;yg in X (with respect to %) and x ^ y is the
greatest lower bound of fx;yg in X: We say that ¡ is strictly supermodular if the above
inequality holds strictly for all r and x;y 2 Xn such that fx _ y;x ^ yg 6= fx;yg:
Supermodular games correspond to games in which the actions of two distinct players
are strategic complements in the sense that the best response correspondences of the players
are increasing (Bulow et al., 1985). It is well known that if ¼r is C2; then ¡ is supermodular
if and only if @2¼r=@xr@xq > 0 for all r 6= q (Topkis, 1978). Moreover, any supermodular
¡ 2 G has at least one symmetric equilibrium, provided that X is compact, and ¼r(¢;x¡r) is
upper semicontinuous for all x¡r 2 Xn¡1 (Topkis, 1979, and Vives, 1990).8,9
We next introduce another interesting subclass of G that we will work with.
Definition. An n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G is said to be positively (nega-
tively) action-monotonic if, for all x 2 Xn;
xr Â (Á) xq implies ¼r(x) > ¼q(x):
Action-monotonicity is a curious property that requires a tight connection (a certain kind
of isotonicity) between payo¤s and actions. While it is not a standard condition for normal
form games, action-monotonicity is nevertheless satis…ed by a wide variety of symmetric
games. In general, any ¡ 2 G with
¼r(x) = ª(xr;Ã(x)); r = 1;:::;n
where ª : X £ R ! R+ is strictly increasing (decreasing) in the …rst component and Ã :
Xn ! R is symmetric, is positively (negatively) action-monotonic. We shall observe below
that several widely studied symmetric games, including common pool resource extraction
and public good games, and Cournot oligopolies with constant average costs, are special
cases of this general formulation.
The …rst main result of this section provides an answer to the general question stated
in the previous section within the broad class of all action-monotonic strictly supermodular
games:
Theorem 1. Let k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g and take any strictly increasing F : R2
+ ! R: Let
¡ 2 G be strictly supermodular with X being any chain. If ¡ is action-monotonic, then for
any ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(k)) with ^ x1 6= ^ xn; we have
¼j(^ x) > ¼i(^ x) 8(i;j) 2 Ik £ Jk:
8Unless otherwise is explicitly stated, all references to topological properties are to be considered in terms
of the Euclidean topology throughout this paper.
9¼r : X ! R is said to be upper (lower) semicontinuous, if, for any x;xm 2 X; m = 1;:::; limxm = x
implies that limsup¼r(xm) 6 ¼r(x) (liminf ¼r(xm) > ¼r(x); resp.)
8Theorem 1 states that at any intragroup symmetric equilibrium of an action monotonic
strictly supermodular game, the absolute payo¤s to interdependent players are strictly
greater than those to independent players, unless both groups take the same equilibrium
action. There are indeed examples of commonly studied games which satisfy the require-
ments of the theorem and in which strict inequality of payo¤s obtains; a number of these are
discussed in Section 3.3 below.
Remark 1. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) have introduced a weakening of the super-
modularity concept, namely quasisupermodularity, which is nevertheless strong enough to
allow fruitful analysis (especially when X is a chain): an n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G
is said to be quasisupermodular, if ¼r(x) > (>)¼r(x ^ y) implies ¼r(x _ y) > (>)¼r(y);
for all x;y 2 Xn and r = 1;:::;n: We note that Theorem 1 remains valid when we replace
strict supermodularity with quasisupermodularity, provided that k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 2g: That
this claim is true becomes apparent upon close inspection of the proof of Theorem 1 which
is given in the appendix. k
The signi…cance of Theorem 1 is limited, however, by the fact that it deals only with
intragroup symmetric equilibria. The following corollary, in contrast, keeps the hypotheses
of linear ordering and action-monotonicity of Theorem 1, but deals with all Nash equilibria
for the special case when there is only one interdependent player.
Corollary 1. Let F : R2
+ ! R be any strictly increasing function. For any action-
monotonic and strictly supermodular ¡ 2 G where X is any chain, and for any ^ x 2 N(¡F(n¡







Corollary 1 states that in the special case when only one of the players has interdependent
preferences, this player earns a payo¤ that is at least as high as the average payo¤ earned by
the remaining (independent) players. Unless all players choose the same action, moreover,
the interdependent player earns a strictly higher level of absolute payo¤s than the popula-
tion average. As we shall see in the next section, this is important from an evolutionary
perspective, since it implies that the extinction of players with interdependent preferences
cannot occur under any payo¤ monotonic evolutionary selection dynamics.
Remark 2. (a) Corollary 1 remains valid if we take X to be any lattice in R`, but
assume that maxf^ xi : i 2 In¡1g 6= ; for all ^ x 2 N(¡F(n ¡ 1)):
(b) The following generalization of Corollary 1 is also true: Let k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g; let X be
any chain, take any strictly increasing F : R2
+ ! R; and let ¡ 2 G be action-monotonic and












As with Corollary 1, this observation (the proof of which is given in the appendix) has
implications in the context of evolutionary preference formation dynamics; see Section 4.1
below. k
Theorem 1 and its corollary rely on the property of action monotonicity, which a number
of important supermodular games do not satisfy. Fortunately, this requirement can also be
relaxed for the case in which only one of the players has interdependent preferences.
Theorem 2. Let F : R2
+ ! R be any strictly increasing function. For any strictly
supermodular ¡ 2 G where X is any lattice, and for any ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(n¡1)) with ^ x1 6= ^ xn;
¼n(^ x) > ¼i(^ x) 8i 2 In¡1:
It is worth noting that Theorem 2 dispenses with two restrictive hypotheses of Theo-
rem 1. Indeed, X need not be linearly ordered for Theorem 2 to work; any partial or-
der on R` (like the familiar vector dominance) would do. Moreover, this result covers all
strictly supermodular games, including those that violate action-monotonicity. In particu-
lar, Theorem 2 shows that the interdependent player unambiguously holds the upper hand
in any strictly supermodular two-person game ¡ 2 G with X being any lattice in R`; for
Nsym(¡F(1)) = N(¡F(1)). Finally, we note that while Theorem 2 refers only to the proper-
ties of intragroup symmetric equilibria, this is not restrictive in models where independent
players always choose the same equilibrium action. The examples given in Subsection 3.3
will show that this observation is at times quite useful.
We conclude this section by demonstrating that action-monotonicity alone is not su¢cient
to yield any of the above results. In particular, the following example illustrates the crucial
role played by supermodularity in Theorems 1 and 2.










Here the strategy space of each agent is the chain f1;2;3g: This game is easily checked
to be (negatively) action monotonic but not supermodular. It has three Nash equilibria,
N(¡) = f(1;3);(3;1);(2;2)g. Taking F(z1;z2) = z1z2 for all z1;z2 > 0; and adopting the










Clearly, N(¡F(1)) = f(1;3)g; and ¼1(1;3) = 3 > 2 = ¼2(1;3): We therefore conclude that in
this game the player with interdependent behavior is subject to a strategic disadvantage.k
Example 1 illustrates that action monotonicity is in fact consistent with the possibility
of interdependent players having a strategic disadvantage against independent players. It
should thus be formally clear that our main inquiry (that is, determining a general subclass
of G the members of which satisfy (4)) is not a trivial one. On the other hand, we know
from Theorem 1 that action monotonicity together with strict supermodularity is su¢cient
for interdependent players to have a strategic advantage over the independent players. Al-
ternative su¢cient conditions for the strategic advantage of interdependent players may be
found, however, that do not rely on supermodularity. The following section deals with the
case of submodular games.
3.2 Submodular Games with Spillovers
As explored by Cooper and John (1988), among others, a wide variety of economically
interesting games exhibit a negative (or positive) spillover e¤ect. In such games, an increase
in the level of action taken by a player decreases (or increases) the absolute payo¤s of all
other players. The strong form of this property is, however, too demanding, for it is not
satis…ed by games in which players have at least one potential action which would nullify the
in‡uence of other players. For instance, in the classical Cournot model of oligopoly, a …rm
may completely annihilate the e¤ect of quantity choices of other …rms on its pro…ts simply
by choosing to shut down. For this reason, we shall work here with a slightly weaker notion
of the spillover e¤ect (which will later be seen to be present in the Cournot game).
Definition. Let
A ´ fx 2 Nsym(¡F(k)) : F : R
2
+ ! R is strictly increasing and k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1g:
An n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G is said to have negative spillovers, if for any x 2 A,
t
1 Â xr Â t
2 implies ¼q(x¡r;t
1) < ¼q(x) < ¼q(x¡r;t
2)
for all r and q 6= r. Games with positive spillovers are de…ned dually.
11It turns out that in games with negative spillovers, there is a tight connection between
action monotonicity and the possibility of ¼j(¹ x) > ¼i(¹ x) holding for all i 2 Ik and all j 2 Jk:
The following proposition aims to drive this point home.
Lemma 1. Let k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g and take any strictly increasing F : R2
+ ! R: For any
¡ 2 G with negative spillovers and any ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(k));
¼j(^ x) > (>)¼i(^ x) 8(i;j) 2 Ik £ Jk
holds only if ^ xj % (Â) ^ xi for all (i;j) 2 Ik £ Jk: Moreover, if k = n ¡ 1; then, for any
i 2 In¡1;
¼n(^ x) > (>)¼i(^ x) if and only if ^ xn % (Â) ^ xi:
This lemma shows that positive action-monotonicity at the equilibrium action pro…le is
essentially a necessary condition for (4) to hold in the case of games with negative spillovers.
It can be shown similarly that negative action monotonicity at the equilibrium action pro…le
is a necessary condition for (4) to hold for games with positive spillovers.
Given that X is a sublattice of R`; an n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G is said to be
submodular if
¼r(x _ y) + ¼r(x ^ y) 6 ¼r(x) + ¼r(y) 8x;y 2 X
n and r = 1;:::;n.
We say that ¡ is strictly submodular if the above inequality holds strictly for all r and
x;y 2 Xn such that fx_y;x^yg 6= fx;yg: In contrast with supermodular games, submodular
games are those in which actions of any two players are strategic substitutes in the sense
that the best response maps of all players are decreasing (Bulow et al., 1985).
Finally, we shall need the following concept for the analysis of this subsection.
Definition. An n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G is called symmetric in equilib-
rium if it does not possess an asymmetric Nash equilibrium, i.e. ^ x 2 N(¡) implies that
^ xi = ^ xj for all i 6= j:
While symmetry in equilibrium is admittedly a demanding property, it is satis…ed by
a variety of commonly studied symmetric games such as the stag hunt game, prisoner’s
dilemma, the common pool resource game, many symmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly
models, and public good games. In fact, for strictly submodular games, this property is
nothing other than the requirement of uniqueness of equilibrium:
Lemma 2. Let ¡ 2 G be a strictly submodular game such that N(¡) 6= ;: Then, ¡ is
symmetric in equilibrium if, and only if, it has a unique equilibrium.
12Our main result takes as primitives those games in G where the common strategy set of
the players is convex and compact, and the payo¤ function of the rth player is continuous
and quasiconcave in xr, for all r:10 Denoting the class of all such games by G0; we are now
ready to state
Theorem 3. Let ¡ 2 G0; k 2 f1;:::;n¡1g and take any strictly increasing F : R2
+ ! R:
If ¡ is a positively (negatively) action monotonic and strictly submodular game with negative
(positive) spillovers, and is symmetric in equilibrium, then, for any ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(k)) such
that ^ x1 6= ^ xn and ¼r(^ x) > 0 for all r; we have
¼j(^ x) > ¼i(^ x) 8(i;j) 2 Ik £Jk:
In words, if a positively (negatively) action monotonic strictly submodulargamewith neg-
ative (positive) spillovers satis…es symmetry in equilibrium, then the interdependent players
have a strategic advantage over the independent players in that at any intragroup symmetric
equilibrium of the game they earn strictly greater absolute payo¤s than independent play-
ers, provided that both groups take distinct equilibrium actions. The examples of the next
subsection will illustrate the power of this observation.
Remark 3. Lemma 1 has demonstrated the necessity of action monotonicity for the
conclusion of Theorem 3 to hold. Since we think of submodular games with spillovers as
primitives in the above analysis, the only question about the tightness of this result con-
cerns the relaxation of the symmetry in equilibrium condition. To see that this condition
too cannot be completely relaxed in Theorem 3, consider the following “hawk-dove” game




and de…ne ¡ as its mixed strategy extension. One can easily verify that ¡ satis…es all the
hypotheses of Theorem 3 except for symmetry in equilibrium, and that ((1;0);(0;1)) 2
Nsym(¡F(1)) where F(z1;z2) = z1z2 for all z1;z2 > 0: Hence there exists an equilibrium in
which the player with interdependent preferences obtains a strictly lower absolute payo¤. k
10We note that assuming compactness of X is often less restrictive than assuming completeness of X as
a chain (i.e. postulating that fsupY;inf Y g ½ X for all Y µ X), provided that % is a completion of the
coordinatewise ordering. For instance, since the order topology derived from the lexicographic ordering is
…ner than theEuclidean topology, and since a chain is compact in itsorder topology i¤ it is complete(Birkho¤,
1963, p.242, Theorem 12), every complete chain w.r.t. the lexicographic ordering must be compact in the
Euclidean topology. It is also worth noting that if X is a complete lattice with respect to the coordinatewise
ordering, then, and only then, it is compact in the Euclidean topology (see Frink, 1942, Theorems 5 and 9).
13In closing, we note that one can again relax the requirement of action-monotonicity when
there is only one interdependent player in the game. The following is then a counterpart to
Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. Let F : R2
+ ! R be any strictly increasing function. If ¡ is a strictly
submodular game with negative or positive spillovers, and is symmetric in equilibrium, then,
for any ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(n ¡ 1)) such that ^ x1 6= ^ xn and ¼r(^ x) > 0 for all r; we have
¼n(^ x) > ¼i(^ x) 8i 2 In¡1:
Theorem 4 provides su¢cient conditions for the single player with interdependent pref-
erences to have a strategic advantage with respect to the remaining players in submodular
games. As with Theorem 2, this result has evolutionary implications. For any game which
satis…es the conditions of the Theorem, a population consisting exclusively of players with in-
dependent preferences will be vulnerable to invasion by the emergence of a single player with
negatively interdependent preferences, under any payo¤ monotonic evolutionary selection
dynamics. This intuition will be formalized in Section 4.1 below.
3.3 Examples
The usefulness of the results presented in the previous section hinges on the degree to which
they may be applied to games of economic interest. In this subsection we present three
classes of such examples.
I. Input and Public Good Games. Consider an n-person game ¡ 2 G with X = [0;!],
0 < ! < 1; where the absolute payo¤ function of player r is additively separable and
de…ned on Xn as






; r = 1;:::;n:
We assume that u and v are strictly positive-valued, strictly increasing C2 functions on
[0;!] and [0;n!] respectively, with u00 < 0; u0(0+) = 1 and u0(!) < v0 (0). The last two
conditions guarantee that the symmetric Nash equilibria of ¡ are interior: We show below
that all equilibria of ¡ are in fact symmetric.
Here, ! stands for the private endowment of agent r; and the action xr is interpreted as
her input (e¤ort) supply to a shared production process or her contribution to the provision
of a public good. In turn, the function u is thought of as the utility provided by privately
consuming own input (or the utility of private consumption good), and the function v as
the utility of jointly produced good (or the public good, respectively). In accordance with
14the general analysis presented in the previous subsections, we assume in what follows that
players k + 1 to n maximize an objective function of the form (3) for some di¤erentiable F
with F1;F2 > 0:
It is easy to see that ¡ is negatively action monotonic and has positive spillovers. To see
that ¡ is symmetric in equilibrium, take any ^ x 2 N(¡) and let ^ xr < ^ xq for some players r























Hence ¡ is symmetric in equilibrium, and the conditions u0(0+) = 1 and u0(!) < v0 (0)
ensure that any equilibrium ^ x is interior, i.e., ^ x 2 (0;!)n for any ^ x 2 N(¡). The same
reasoning also shows that ^ xi1 = ^ xi2 for all i1;i2 2 Ik and all ^ x 2 N(¡F(k)). (Notice that the
last observation implies that Nsym(¡F(n ¡ 1)) = N(¡F(n ¡ 1))). Finally, we claim that the
equilibrium actions of independent and interdependent agents are di¤erent from each other,
i.e., ^ xi 6= ^ xj for any (i;j) 2 Ik £ Jk and any ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(k)): Note that ^ xi 2 [0;!) for
all i 2 Ik since u0(0+) = 1: Now suppose that for each player i 2 Ik, we have ^ xi 2 (0;!)
so that @¼i(^ x)=@xi = 0: If there was an (i;j) 2 Ik £ Jk such that ^ xi = ^ xj; we would have













!¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
x=^ x
< 0;
while we must have @pj(^ x)=@xj = 0 since ^ xj = ^ xi 2 (0;!): Hence, when independent players
take an interior action, ^ xi 6= ^ xj for any (i;j) 2 Ik £ Jk and any ^ x 2 N(¡F(k)): Finally
suppose that for each player i 2 Ik, we have ^ xi = 0. If it were also the case that for each
player j 2 Jk, we have ^ xj = 0, then ^ x could not be an equilibrium since u0(!) < v0 (0)
and independent players could bene…t from a unilateral deviation. Hence ^ xi 6= ^ xj for any
(i;j) 2 Ik £ Jk and any ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(k)):
Now, if v isstrictly convex (concave), then the game is strictly supermodular (submodular)
and since we have established above that ^ x1 6= ^ xn for any ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(k)); we may use
Theorem 1 (Theorem 3) to conclude that at any intragroup symmetric equilibrium the agents
with interdependent preferences obtain strictly higher absolute payo¤s than do agents with
independent preferences. Moreover, since we have found above that Nsym(¡F(n ¡ 1)) =
N(¡F(n¡1)), if there is only one interdependent player in the game, it follows from Theorem
2 (Theorem 4, resp.) that this player receives a strictly higher absolute payo¤ than any
independent agent at any Nash equilibrium of ¡F(n ¡1): k
II. Diamond-type Search Models. Here we consider a standard search model (cf. Diamond,
1982, and Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) that is characterized by a game ¡ 2 G in which
15X = [0;»]; 0 < » < 1; and xr 2 X is interpreted as the search e¤ort by player r: The







¡ C(xr) + K; r = 1;:::;n
where K is a constant, and f and C are twice di¤erentiable functions with
f
0 > 0; C
0 > 0; C
00 > 0; C
0(») > f((n ¡ 1)»); f(0) > C
0(0) and K > C(»):11
As usual, we interpret C as standing for the private cost of search e¤ort.
It is easy to verify that while ¡ is supermodular, it is not action monotonic, and therefore,
Theorem 1 does not apply to this game. Yet, from Theorem 2 we can deduce the following:
if there is only one interdependent player in ¡; then she earns strictly higher absolute payo¤s
than any other independent player at any intragroup symmetric equilibrium. In fact, this
applies to any equilibrium since we again have Nsym(¡F(n ¡ 1)) = N(¡F(n ¡ 1)) for any
strictly increasing F. To see this, suppose for contradiction that ^ xi1 > ^ xi2 for any i1;i2 2 In¡1
where ^ x 2 N(¡F(n ¡ 1)): But C0(») > f((n ¡ 1)») and f(0) > C0(0) together imply that
(^ xi1; ^ xi2) 2 (0;»)















0(^ xi2) = 0:
But these equations cannot hold simultaneously, for, given that f0 > 0 and C00 > 0; the
hypothesis ^ xi1 > ^ xi2 implies that f(
P
r6=i1 ^ xr) < f(
P
r6=i2 ^ xr) and C0(^ xi1) > C0(^ xi2): Further-
more, by a reasoning similar to the one used in the previous example we can show that the
interdependent agent’s equilibrium action is di¤erent from that of any of the independent
agents. We thus obtain the following result: when there is only one interdependent player
in the population, at any equilibrium of the Diamond-type search model considered above,
the interdependent player obtains strictly higher payo¤s than everybody else. k
III. Arms Races.12 Two countries are engaged in an arms race. The associated game ¡ is
assumed symmetric with X = [0;³]; 0 < ³ < 1; and
¼r(x) = B(xr ¡ x¡r) ¡ C(xr) 8x 2 X
2 and r = 1;2:
An action for a country is a level of military expenditure. We assume that B : [¡³;³] ! R
and C : X ! R+ are twice continuously di¤erentiable and satisfy:
B
0 > 0; B
00 < 0; C
0 > 0; C




11The constant K > C(») is introduced into the payo¤ function just to ensure that ¼r(x) > 0 for all
x 2 [0;»]n and r = 1;::;n: Obviously, this does not alter the strategic structure of ¡ in any way.
12The present formulation of this example is again taken from Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
16In addition, assume that for any pair of actions (x1;x2) in X2, B(x1 ¡x2)¡C(x1) > 0 (this
is simply to ensure that payo¤s are positive at all admissible action pro…les). Now suppose
that country 2 decides to act aggressively and thus aims at maximizing an objective function
of the type (3) for some di¤erentiable F with F1;F2 > 0. Country 1 simply maximizes its
own material payo¤ ¼1.
It is easy to see that strict concavity of B guarantees that ¡ is strictly supermodular.
Therefore, while ¡ need not be action-monotonic (so that Theorem 1 need not apply), by
using Theorem 2 we may conclude that ¼2(^ x) > ¼1(^ x) for all ^ x 2 N(¡F(1)) with ^ x1 6= ^ x2:
However, since C0(³) > B0(0) > C0(0); we have ^ x1 2 (0;³) so that, by a similar reasoning
used in the analysis of input games above, we can show that no ^ x 2 N(¡F(1)) can satisfy
^ x1 = ^ x2. Hence ¼2(^ x) > ¼1(^ x) holds for all ^ x 2 N(¡F(1)). In other words, the country
with the interdependent preferences has a strictly higher payo¤ at any equilibrium. Since
the present game is with negative spillovers, Lemma 1 allows us to say more: the country
with the interdependent objective function will be the one that is more heavily armed at any
equilibrium. This is certainly in line with the intuition that country 2 is a more aggressive
player than country 1. k
4 Economic Applications
4.1 Theory of Preference Formation
An important question in the theory of individual preferences that has recently received some
attention is whether individuals are indeed absolute payo¤ maximizers as is usually assumed
in conventional economic models (see Frank, 1987, Bolton, 1991, Cole et al., 1992, Bisin
and Verdier, 1996, and Koçkesen et al., 1997, among others.) The alternative hypothesis is
that an individual’s well-being is determined not only by the intrinsic utility of her material
consumption, but also her relative material standing in the society; the so-called relative
income hypothesis (or keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect). There is now substantial evidence
suggesting that the “relative standing” concern of individuals is indeed a fact of life (see
Frank, 1987, Clark and Oswald, 1996, and references cited therein).
One way in which the nature of individual preferences can be explained is by an appeal
to evolutionary arguments. The evolutionary theory of preference formation is based on
the premise that individual preferences come to being as a result of an unplanned process
of transmission in which children inherit the preferences of their parents or peers either by
genetic transmission, imitation or socialization. The population composition is typically
assumed to evolve according to an (absolute) payo¤ monotonic evolutionary selection dy-
namic: those behaviors which yield the highest material rewards are replicated with greatest
17frequency from one generation to the next. If one type of behavior persistently outperforms
all others, it will be the sole surviving behavior in the long run.13 Indeed, Friedman (1953)
justi…ed the independence of preferences by claiming that a pattern of behavior that does
not maximize one’s own material payo¤s will eventually be driven to extinction. Based
on the results of the previous section, the validity of this evolutionary argument is clearly
questionable in a great many strategic environments. In this section, by a straightforward
application of our previous results, we shall demonstrate formally that evolution may well
favor the emergence of at least some individuals with interdependent preferences as opposed
to a homogeneous population of absolute payo¤ maximizers.
Consider a discrete time overlapping generations scenario in which each person lives for
two periods and asexually produces a …nite number of children in the second period of her
life. In period ¿; there are n¿ many individuals in the society who are in the …rst period of
their lives. These individuals interact with each other through playing an n¿-person game
¡¿ 2 G¿, where G¿ is the set of all n¿-person symmetric games that have `-dimensional
action spaces and that satisfy (2):14 Suppose that at some period ¿0, all individuals in
the population have independent preferences, that is, they seek to maximize their absolute
payo¤s. Suppose further that in the subsequent period ¿0 + 1, one of the young individuals
turns out (for instance by random mutation) to have negatively interdependent preferences.
The question that we wish to address is the following: if the population composition evolves
underpressure of di¤erential material payo¤s, asisnormally assumed, will it tend to return to
it’s original monomorphic state or diverge further from it? In other words, is a monomorphic
population of absolute payo¤ maximizers locally stable under payo¤ monotonic evolutionary
selection dynamics if the emergence of individuals with negatively interdependent preferences
is permitted? The answer, of course, depends on the particular structure of f¡¿g1
¿=1 and
the postulated selection dynamics. The results of the previous section, however, allows us
to give a negative answer to this question under considerably general circumstances.
The idea that a monomorphic population of absolute payo¤ maximizers is locally stable
under all payo¤ monotonic selection dynamics is captured by the following stability concept.
Definition. Let ¡¿ 2 G¿; ¿ 2 N; and take any strictly increasing F : R2
+ ! R: We say
that independent preferences are evolutionarily F-stable if, for all ¿, there exists some
13There are several applications of this approach in the economics literature, including the evolution of risk
aversion, altruism among kin, and systematic expectational biases; see Koçkesen et al. (1997) for references.
14The evolutionary scenario considered here is one in which each individual interacts with each other
member of the population in each period (the “playing the …eld” model). An alternative would be to
consider interaction that occurs in randomly matched subgroups drawn from the population in each period.
The case of pairwise random matching is explored in Koçkesen et al. (1997).
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They are said to be evolutionarily unstable if they are not evolutionarily F-stable for any
strictly increasing F.
This particular notion of evolutionary stability is a straightforward re‡ection of the corre-
sponding …nite population stability concepts advanced by Scha¤er (1989) and Vega-Redondo
(1996, p. 32) in ourframework. It says that independent preferences are evolutionarily unsta-
ble if an originally monomorphic population composed only of independent agents does not
stand a chance of expelling any mutant negatively interdependent behavior.15 Needless to
say, given a particular game sequence f¡¿g1
¿=1; if independent preferences were evolutionarily
unstable in the sense de…ned above, then they would be unstable under any deterministic
(absolute) payo¤ monotonic selection dynamics (such as the replicator dynamics) which
require that the share of independent agents in the population grows if and only if they
obtain, on average, higher absolute payo¤s than interdependent agents in the stage game.
Our notion of evolutionary instability is therefore quite a general one subsuming most of the
instability concepts used in evolutionary game theory. Moreover, it does not require us to
address the problem of equilibrium selection: if independent preferences are evolutionarily
unstable, then, regardless of which equilibrium is selected in each period, there will be no
pressure on the population composition to return to its initial monomorphic state once a
player with negatively interdependent preferences of any kind has emerged.






¿ : x1 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = xn¿¡1 for all x 2 N(¡
¿
F(n¿ ¡ 1)) and all strictly increasing Fg,
for all ¿ 2 N. The class G¿
¤ is a re…nement of G¿ which requires that all independent agents
take the same action at any equilibrium of ¡¿
F(n¿ ¡ 1). This requirement is completely
unrestrictive in most of the economic applications discussed in this paper. For instance,
in all the n¿-person games considered in Section 3.3 (along with the Cournot oligopoly
discussed next), all independent agents take the same equilibrium actions no matter how
many interdependent agents are in the population. All these games are thus members of G¿
¤.
We are now ready to state the following
Proposition 1. Let ¡¿ 2 G¿
¤ for all ¿ 2 N; and assume that the action space of ¡¿ is
a lattice. Independent preferences are evolutionarily unstable if, for all ¿,
15Since the population is …nite in our framework, we follow Scha¤er, 1989, in formalizing the notion of “a
small deviation from independent behavior” by the mutation of a single agent.
19(i) ¡¿ is strictly supermodular; or
(ii) ¡¿ belongs to G¿
0, is strictly submodular and symmetric in equilibrium, and has neg-
ative or positive spillovers.16
Proof. Since ¡¿ 2 G¿
¤, we have Nsym(¡¿
F(n ¡ 1)) = N(¡¿
F(n ¡ 1)) for all ¿;n 2 N and
all strictly increasing F: The claims are thus established upon applying Theorems 2 and 4,
respectively. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 shows that in a great variety of economic circumstances (which include
all of the games presented in Section 3.3), there are evolutionary reasons to believe that
the population will not be composed only of absolute payo¤ maximizers in the long run;
one should expect the presence of at least some individuals with negatively interdependent
preferences.17 Moreover, even when preferences are acquired as a result of the deliberate
socialization e¤orts of parents who seek to inculcate preferences in their children with a view
to providing them with greater material payo¤s in their adult lives, the resulting population
dynamics will be payo¤ monotonic and the above result applies. At the very least, this calls
into question the almost universal practice of modeling economic agents as absolute payo¤
maximizers.
4.2 The Cournot Oligopoly
Objective functions which incorporate relative payo¤ concerns are particularly easy to justify
in the case of …rms which separate management from ownership. In the presence of some
common uncertainty which a¤ects all …rms within an industry, the performance of other …rms
may provide valuable information about a manager’s ability or e¤ort which is otherwise
unobservable to the owners. Owners may therefore bene…t from writhing contracts with
managers in which the compensation of the latter is based, in part, on the performance
of their …rm relative to that of other …rms, or relative to some industry average.18 This,
in turn, would provide an incentive for managers (even if they are themselves absolute
payo¤ maximizers) to pursue the maximization of objective functions which have the form
16By Corollary 1, the same conclusion also holds for all strictly supermodular and action monotonic
¡¿ 2 G¿nG¿
¤ where the related action spaces are arbitrary chains in R`.
17In fact, in the context of certain speci…c games, more can be said. For instance, if the individuals
are playing standard commons or public goods games (not necessarily with additively separable payo¤
functions), then one can show that the unique stable population composition with respect to any absolute
payo¤ monotonic dynamics is monomorphic with all individuals being interdependent. For a proof and
various extensions of this result, see Koçkesen et al. (1997).
18See, among others, Holmström (1979, 1982) and Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983). Gibbons and Murphy
(1990) provide supportive empirical evidence.
20of interdependent preferences.19 The results of Section 3 can thus be used to show that such
contracts may have the unplanned e¤ect of yielding a strategic advantage to a …rm, enabling
it to achieve a higher level of pro…tability than its pro…t-maximizing competitors.
Consider an oligopolistic industry composed of n …rms with identical cost structures
producing a homogenous product. Firm r chooses an output level xr 2 X = [0; ¹ Q]; 0 < ¹ Q <
1; where ¹ Q is interpreted as the capacity limit on a …rm’s output level. The pro…t function







¡ C(xr); r = 1;:::;n;
where the inverse demand function P is a strictly positive and twice di¤erentiable function
on [0;n ¹ Q] and the cost function C is a nonnegative, twice di¤erentiable function on [0; ¹ Q]:
We make the standard assumptions that demand is downward sloping and average cost is
non-decreasing:
P
0 < 0; C(0) = 0; C
0 > 0; C
00 > 0:















< 0 8x 2 [0; ¹ Q]
n: (5)
Note that concavity of P would imply (5). Denote the resulting Cournot game by ¡C 2 G,
and make the additional assumptions that P(n ¹ Q) > C( ¹ Q)= ¹ Q, to ensure positive pro…ts for
each …rm at any output pro…le, and P(0) > C0(0), to ensure that each …rm produces a
strictly positive amount at any Cournot equilibrium. The latter condition also guarantees
that ¡C has the negative spillovers property. Moreover, by means of an argument similar to
that used in the case of input games above, one can show that this game is symmetric in
equilibrium. Since it is easy to verify the existence of an equilibrium, we may conclude by
Lemma 2 that ¡C has in fact a unique equilibrium.
Our …rst result shows that, in the case of a duopoly, one can obtain a particularly strong
result regarding the relative performance of an interdependent …rm in competition with an
independent …rm.
Proposition 2. Take any Cournot duopoly ¡C in which the …rms produce below full
capacity in equilibrium and let F : R2
+ ! R be strictly increasing. Then, at any ^ x 2
19Another reason why interdependent preferences could be of interest for the theory of industrial orga-
nization is the close connection between the relative pro…ts and the market share of a …rm. For instance,
provided that average costs are constant and relative pro…ts are well-de…ned, we have ¼r(x)=¹ ¼(x) = xr=¹ x for
all x: Therefore, negatively interdependent preferences in the context of Cournot competition with constant
average costs encompasses the case of sales or market share maximization on the part of managers.
21N(¡C
F(1)); we have ¼1(^ x) < ¼2(^ x); i.e., the …rm with interdependent preferences obtains a
strictly higher pro…t than does the independent …rm.
Proof. First we show that at any ^ x 2 N(¡C
F(1)), ^ x1 6= ^ x2. Suppose, by way of
contradiction, that ^ x1 = ^ x2 = a. If a = ¹ Q; then by symmetry of ¡C; we must have
N(¡C) = f( ¹ Q; ¹ Q)g which is outlawed by hypothesis. If, on the other hand, a = 0; then
N(¡C) = f(0;0)g which contradicts P(0) > C0(0): Hence, a 2 (0; ¹ Q). But then we must have
@¼1(^ x)=@x1 = 0 and @p2(^ x)=@x2 = 0; while these two equations cannot hold simultaneously
as can be veri…ed by a reasoning similar to the one used in the input games example of
Section 3.3. Hence ^ x1 6= ^ x2 and, since ¡C is strictly submodular with negative spillovers,
and is symmetric in equilibrium, the result follows from Theorem 4. Q.E.D.
A similar result can be established for the Cournot oligopoly model with n …rms which
operate under constant marginal costs. In this case it is easily veri…ed that ¡C is positively
action monotonic and, moreover, that all equilibria of ¡C
F(k) are such that all independent
players take the same action. As long as at least one …rm produces under its capacity in any
Cournot equilibrium of ¡C, it can be shown that at any ^ x 2 Nsym(¡C
F(k)), ^ xi 6= ^ xn for all
i 2 Ik, so that the application of Theorem 3 immediately yields ¼i(^ x) < ¼n(^ x) for all i 2 Ik.
Furthermore, in the special case when k = n¡1, all Nash equilibria of ¡C
F(k) are intragroup
symmetric. Hence, if a single …rm in an industry has an objective function that places some
weight on relative pro…ts, it will be more pro…table in any equilibrium than all of its pro…t
maximizing competitors.
For even a more general class of Cournot oligopoly models in which we relax the assump-
tion of linear cost functions, obtaining similar results requires one additional condition to
ensure that the game is action monotonic.
Proposition 3. Take any Cournot oligopoly ¡C in which the …rms produce below full
capacity in equilibrium20 and let F : R2
+ ! R be strictly increasing. Then, if P(n ¹ Q) >
C0( ¹ Q), ¼i(^ x) < ¼j(^ x) holds for all (i;j) 2 Ik £ Jk and all ^ x 2 Nsym(¡C
F(k)).
Proof. The condition P(n ¹ Q) > C0( ¹ Q) guaranteesthat ¡C ispositively action-monotonic.
The same reasoning used in the Proof of Proposition 2 can be used to demonstrate that
^ x1 6= ^ xn at all ^ x 2 Nsym(¡C
F(k)). Since ¡C action monotonic, strictly submodular with neg-
ative spillovers, and is symmetric in equilibrium, the result follows from Theorem 3.Q.E.D.
To summarize, in many Cournot oligopoly models, managers who include relative pro…t
considerations in their decision making process (say, due to incentive contracts) will obtain
20A su¢cient condition for this is P(n ¹ Q) + ¹ QP 0(n ¹ Q) ¡C0( ¹ Q) < 0.
22higher pro…ts in equilibrium than the industry average.21 In view of Lemma 1, which in the
present context links the pro…ts of a …rm to its production, the results of this section pro-
vide an explanation for the anecdotal observation that some industries (such as the personal
computer industry) are characterized by very unequal markets shares and a high degree of
concentration despite the fact that the constituent …rms operate under remarkably similar
cost structures. This explanation is somewhat novel, since is does not rely on the di¤eren-
tiation of products and advertising activities of …rms which are usually claimed to account
for this phenomenon.
Finally, the …ndings of this section have immediate implications for the long run survival
of …rms within an industry if the entry and exit of …rms occurs on the basis of pro…tability.
The idea of Darwinian selection in industrial dynamics is not a new one; several authors
have argued that competition in an industry resembles biological competition in that more
pro…table practices are replicated more rapidly (see, for instance, Alchian, 1950, Friedman,
1953, and Sha¤er, 1989). Along these lines, our results imply that the …rm behavior that
corresponds to an interdependent objective function will thrive at the expense of absolute
pro…t maximizing behavior in the long run.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have tried to uncover the generality of the statement that negatively inter-
dependent preferences provide one with a strategic advantage over agents who are motivated
exclusively by a concern with their own material payo¤s. It turns out that there is a broad
class of strategic environments in which such an advantage is found to exist, and that there
is a close connection between this phenomenon and the properties of strategic complemen-
tarity and substitutability in games. The …nding that those with interdependent preferences
earn greater absolute payo¤s than do (absolute) payo¤ maximizers in such environments has
direct implications for theories of preference formation and managerial decision making. In
light of our theoretical results, the assumption of absolute payo¤ maximizing behavior on
the part of individuals or …rms should not be made as routinely as is done in applications of
game theory (on this point, see also Frank, 1987, and Bolton, 1991).
There are a number of directions in which the present work may be extended. The results
of Koçkesen, et al. (1997) prove that the su¢cient conditions provided here for interdepen-
dent players to outperform independent players are not necessary. Therefore, determining
precisely the class of all normal-form games such that this phenomenon occurs remains an
21See also Vickers (1984), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) for a similar conclusion in the
context of closely related models where the separation of the owner and manager incentives are explicitly
modeled.
23open problem. It also remains to be seen whether results analogous to ours can be obtained
in extensive form and dynamic games. Finally, we stress that our entire analysis has been
conducted under the hypothesis of complete information. This is certainly a considerable
limitation; entertaining the notion that interdependent preferences are a plausible alterna-
tive to the standard assumption of independent preferences arguably necessitates that the
game at hand should be modeled as an incomplete information game.22 The incomplete
information issue is an important one which we hope to address in future research.
22As noted by Bolton (1997, p. 1112) in the context of the ultimatum bargaining environment, “... the
marginal rate of substitution between absolute and relative money most likely varies by individual, making
utility functions private information.”
24Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume …rst that ¡ is positively action-monotonic, and take any
^ x = ([a]k;[b]n¡k) 2 Nsym(¡F(k)). In what follows, we shall show that a - b must hold; this
will yield the claim by virtue of positive action-monotonicity. Let us assume for contradiction
then that a Â b:
Since ¼1 = p1; by de…nition of Nash equilibrium, ¼1([a]k;[b]n¡k) > ¼1(b;[a]k¡1;[b]n¡k) so
that, by using (1) with ¾(1) = n; ¾(n) = 1 and ¾(r) = r for all r = 2 f1;ng; we …nd
¼n(b;[a]k¡1;[b]n¡k¡1;a) > ¼n(b;[a]k¡1;[b]n¡k) = ¼n((b;[a]k¡1;[b]n¡k¡1;a) ^ ([a]k;[b]n¡k)):
By strict supermodularity, therefore,
¼n(^ x¡n;a) = ¼n([a]k;[b]n¡k¡1;a) = ¼n((b;[a]k¡1;[b]n¡k¡1;a) _ ([a]k;[b]n¡k))
> ¼n([a]k;[b]n¡k) = ¼n(^ x) (6)
holds. Now suppose ¼n(^ x) = 0: From (2) and (6) it follows that ¼n(^ x¡n;a) > 0; and since F
is strictly increasing,






> F(0;0) = pn(^ x)
contradicting that ^ x is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, we assume henceforth that ¼n(^ x) > 0: But









by (6) and strict monotonicity of F:
By the symmetry of ¡, it is readily observed that
¼n(^ x¡n;a) = ¼1([a]k;[b]n¡k¡1;a) = ¢ ¢ ¢ = ¼k([a]k;[b]n¡k¡1;a)
and ¼k+1([a]k;[b]n¡k¡1;a) = ¢¢¢ = ¼n¡1([a]k;[b]n¡k¡1;a): But by the hypotheses of a Â b and
positive action-monotonicity, we must have ¼n(^ x¡n;a) > ¼n¡1([a]k;[b]n¡k¡1;a) so that
n X
r=1
¼r(^ x¡n;a) = (k + 1)¼n(^ x¡n;a) + (n ¡ k ¡ 1)¼n¡1(^ x¡n;a) 6 n¼n(^ x¡n;a):
(This inequality holds as an equality i¤ k = n ¡ 1.) Therefore using the above inequality








25But by the symmetry of ¡; we have
P
¼r(^ x) = k¼1(^ x)+(n¡k)¼n(^ x); and therefore the above
inequality yields ¼n([a]k;[b]n¡k) > ¼1([a]k;[b]n¡k): However, since a Â b; this contradicts
positive action-monotonicity of ¡; and we are done.
To complete the proof of the theorem, assume now that ¡ is negatively action-monotonic.
De…ne ¡¡ = (f¡Xgi=1;:::;n;f¼
¡
i gi=1;:::;ng 2 G where ¼¡(x) = ¼(¡x) for all x 2 ¡X: Since,
for all x 2 ¡X; xi Â xj implies ¡xi Á ¡xj; 23 the negative action-monotonicity of ¡ yields
¼
¡
i (x) = ¼i(¡x) > ¼j(¡x) = ¼
¡
j (x) whenever xi Â xj: Hence, ¡¡ is positively action-
monotonic. Therefore, by the …rst part of the theorem established above, we have
¼
¡
j (^ x) > ¼
¡





F(k)) = ¡Nsym(¡F(k)); we then have ¼j(¡^ x) > ¼i(¡^ x) for all i 2 Ik; j 2 Jk
and all ¡^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(k)): The proof is complete. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. We assume that ¡ is positively action-monotonic, for the
case of negative action-monotonicity can be easily settled as in the proof of Theorem 1. If
^ x1 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = ^ xn¡1; then the claim follows from Theorem 1. So assume that ^ xi 6= ^ xi0 for some
i;i0 2 In¡1; and let ^ x1 be the maximum of f^ x1;:::; ^ xn¡1g w.r.t. %; relabelling if necessary.
(Since % is alinear order, maxf^ x1;:::; ^ xn¡1g 6= ;.) We nowproceed asin the proof of Theorem
1 to eliminate the trivial case of ¼n(^ x) = 0; and to obtain the corresponding version of (7)





¼n(^ x¡n; ^ x1)
Pn¡1
i=1 ¼i(^ x¡n; ^ x1) + ¼n(^ x¡n; ^ x1)
: (8)
(Implicit in this inequality is the fact that ¼n(^ x¡n; ^ x1) > 0 which is guaranteed by (6).) But
since ^ x1 % ^ xi for all i 2 In¡1 and ^ x1 Â ^ xi for some i 2 In¡1; by positive action-monotonicity,
we have
(n ¡ 1)¼n(^ x¡n; ^ x1) = (n ¡ 1)¼1(^ x¡n; ^ x1) >
n¡1 X
i=1
¼i(^ x¡n; ^ x1)
so that (8) yields ¼n(^ x)=
P
¼r(^ x) > 1=n; and the result follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Remark 2 (b). Assume that ¡ is positively action-monotonic, w.l.o.g.. Let
^ x1 = maxf^ xi : i 2 Ikg; and notice that claim is immediate by positive action-monotonicity if
^ xn % ^ x1: So, let ^ x1 Â ^ xn: Since we can eliminate the trivial case of ¼n(^ x) = 0 as in the proof




¼n(^ x¡n; ^ x1)
Pk
i=1¼i(^ x¡n; ^ x1) + (n ¡ k ¡1)¼n¡1(^ x¡n; ^ x1) + ¼n(^ x¡n; ^ x1)
>
¼n(^ x¡n; ^ x1)





23Since (R`;%) is an ordered vector space, we have xi Â xj ) xi ¡ xj Â ([0]`) ) ¡xj Â ¡xi:
26Here, the …rst inequality is derived in a way analogous to (8), the second inequality follows
from action monotonicity and ^ x1 % ^ xi for all i 2 Ik; and …nally, the third inequality follows
from action monotonicity and ^ x1 Â ^ xk+1 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = ^ xn. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let ^ x = ([a]n¡1;b) 2 Nsym(¡F(n ¡ 1)). If a Â b; we can easily
show that ¼n(^ x) and ¼n(^ x¡n;a) = ¼n([a]n) are strictly positive as in the proof of Theorem
1, and then recalling that (7) was obtained above without using the action-monotonicity
property, we may conclude that
¼n([a]n¡1;b)
(n ¡1)¼1([a]n¡1;b) + ¼n([a]n¡1;b)
>
¼n([a]n)





which yields ¼n(^ x) > ¼1(^ x): Assume now that b Â a; and note that we can again show that
¼n(^ x) and ¼n([a]n) are strictly positive by using strict supermodularity as in the proof of
Theorem 1. On the other hand, since ¼1(^ x) > ¼1(b;[a]n¡2;b); we have
¼n(x) > ¼n(b;[a]n¡2;b) (10)
where x = (b;[a]n¡1): But then b Â a implies that
¼n([a]n) = ¼n(x ^ ^ x) > ¼n(^ x) (11)
for otherwise, by strict supermodularity, we would …nd
¼n(b;[a]n¡2;b) = ¼n(x _ ^ x) > ¼n(x)
which contradicts (10). Yet, (11) and the fact that pn(^ x) > pn([a]n) yield (9), completing
the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that ^ x = ([a]k;[b]n¡k) for some a;b 2 X with a Â b:
Then, by hypothesis, negative spillovers e¤ect, and symmetry of ¡,
¼1([a]k;[b]n¡k) 6 ¼n([a]k;[b]n¡k) < ¼n(b;[a]k¡1;[b]n¡k) = ¼1(b;[a]k¡1;[b]n¡k)
and this contradicts that playing a is a best response for player 1 against ([a]k¡1;[b]n¡k): The
…rst assertion follows by the completeness and antisymmetry of %.
To prove the second assertion, let k = n ¡ 1 and notice that all we have to show is that
¼n(^ x) > ¼1(^ x) whenever b Â a: Assume then for contradiction that
b Â a and ¼n([a]n¡1;b) 6 ¼1([a]n¡1;b): (12)
Since ® 7! ®=(¿ + ®) is a strictly increasing mapping in ® > 0 for any ¿ > 0; (12) implies
that
¼n(^ x)
(n ¡ 1)¼1(^ x) + ¼n(^ x)
6
¼1(^ x)





27Since b is a best response of player n against [a]n¡1 in ¡F(n¡1); we must have ¼n([a]n¡1;b) >
¼n([a]n): Therefore, by the negative spillovers e¤ect and symmetry of ¡, we have
¼1([a]n¡1;b) < ¼1([a]n) = ¼n([a]n) 6 ¼n([a]n¡1;b)
which contradicts (12). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. If ([a]n);([b]n) 2 N(¡); then
¼1((a;[b]n¡1) ^ (b;[a]n¡1)) + ¼1((a;[b]n¡1) _ (b;[a]n¡1)) = ¼1([a]n) + ¼1([b]n)
> ¼1(b;[a]n¡1) + ¼1(a;[b]n¡1):
Hence, unless a = b; ¡ cannot be strictly submodular. The converse statement trivially
follows from the symmetry of ¡: Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3. This theorem is an immediate consequence of the following
Lemma A. Let ¡ 2 G0; k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g and take any strictly increasing F : R2
+ ! R:
If ¡ is a strictly submodular game with negative spillovers, and is symmetric in equilibrium,
then, for any ^ x 2 Nsym(¡F(k)) with ¼r(^ x) > 0 for all r; we have
^ xj % ^ xi 8(i;j) 2 Ik £Jk:
Proof. Let ^ x = ([a]k;[b]n¡k) 2 Nsym(¡F(k)) for some a;b 2 X: Clearly, since a is a best
response of player 1 against ([a]k¡1;[b]n¡k) in ¡F(k); we have
¼1([a]k;[b]n¡k) > ¼1(t;[a]k¡1;[b]n¡k) 8t 2 X: (13)
We claim that
¼n([a]k;[b]n¡k) > ¼n([a]k;[b]n¡k¡1;t) 8t 2 ft
0 2 X : t
0 Â bg: (14)
To see this, let us assume for contradiction that
¼n(^ x¡n;t) = ¼n([a]k;[b]n¡k¡1;t) > ¼n([a]k;[b]n¡k) = ¼n(^ x) > 0 (15)
holds for some t 2 X with t Â b: Since ® 7! ®=(¿ + ®) is a strictly increasing mapping in
® > 0 for any ¿ > 0; we must then have
¼n(^ x)
Pn¡1




r=1 ¼r(^ x) + ¼n(^ x¡n;t)
(16)
But since t Â b; the negative spillovers e¤ect yields ¼r(^ x) > ¼r(^ x¡n;t) for all r 6= n so that
¼n(^ x¡n;t)
Pn¡1




r=1 ¼r(^ x¡n;t) + ¼n(^ x¡n;t)
:
28But this inequality, (16) and (15) yield pn(^ x¡n;t) > pn(^ x) which contradicts that ^ x is a Nash
equilibrium of ¡F(k): Therefore, we must conclude that (14) holds.
Now, for any ®;¯ 2 X; de…ne the correspondences K¯ : X ¶ X and L® : X ¶ X as
K¯(®) ´ argmax
t2X
¼1(t;[®]k¡1;[¯]n¡k) and L®(¯) ´ argmax
t2X
¼n([®]k;[¯]n¡k¡1;t):
We de…ne next the double sequence (am;bm) 2 X2 recursively as follows:
a0 = a; b0 = b; am 2 Kbm(am) and bm 2 Lam¡1(bm); m = 1;2;:::
Claim 1. (am;bm) is well-de…ned.
Proof of Claim 1. Fix any ®;¯ 2 X: Since X is a convex compact set, and ¼1 and ¼n are
continuous, K¯ and L® must be nonempty (by Weierstrass’ theorem) and must have closed
graphs (by Berge’s maximum theorem). Moreover, quasiconcavity of ¼1 and ¼n entail that
K¯ and L® are convex-valued. Therefore, by Kakutani’s …xed point theorem, there exist
…xed points of K¯ and L®: Since ® and ¯ were arbitrary in this reasoning, we may conclude
that (am) and (bm) are well-de…ned sequences. k
Let Br : Xn¡1 ¶ X be the best response correspondence of player r. We note that, for
any ®;¯ 2 X;
B
i([®]k¡1;[¯]n¡k) = K¯(®) 8i 2 Ik (17)
and
B
j([®]k;[¯]n¡k¡1) = L®(¯) 8j 2 Jk (18)
hold by symmetry of ¡:
Claim 2. If a Â b; then a0 Â a1 Â a2 Â ¢¢¢ and ¢¢¢ Â b2 Â b1 Â b0.
Proof of Claim 2. Let a Â b: We shall …rst establish that b1 6= b0: If b1 = b; then
b1 2 La(b1) implies by (18) that b 2 Bj([a]k;[b]n¡k¡1) for all j 2 Jk: But then since a 2
Bi([a]k¡1;[b]n¡k) for all i 2 Ik; it follows that ([a]k;[b]n¡k) 2 N(¡); contradicting that ¡ is
symmetric in equilibrium. If, on the other hand, b1 Â b; then (14) yields that
¼n(^ x) > ¼n([a]k;[b]n¡k¡1;b1):
But then by submodularity of ¼n;
¼n([a]k;[b1]n¡k) < ¼n([a]k;[b1]n¡k¡1;b)
which, in turn, contradicts that b1 2 La(b1): We thus conclude that b Â b1:
Next, we claim that a1 % a0: But by (13) and the fact that a1 2 Kb1(a1); we have
¼1([a]k;[b]n¡k) > ¼1(a1;[a]k¡1;[b]n¡k) and ¼1([a1]k;[b1]n¡k) > ¼1(a;[a1]k¡1;[b1]n¡k): Clearly,
29given that b Â b1; if a Â a1; the last two inequalitieswould contradictthestrict submodularity
of ¼1: Therefore, a1 % a must hold. In fact, a1 6= a; for otherwise, a1 2 Kb1(a1) and
b1 2 La(b1) would yield that ([a]k;[b1]n¡k) 2 N(¡); and this would contradict ¡’s symmetry
in equilibrium since then a Â b Â b1 would have to hold. By linearity of %; therefore, we
have a1 Â a0:
Finally, we claim that b1 Â b2: (Since we used (14) in establishing that b0 Â b1; this step
is necessary to be able to complete the proof by induction.) This claim follows from the fact
that b1 2 La(b1) and b2 2 La1(b2) imply that ¼n([a]k;[b1]n¡k) > ¼n([a]k;[b1]n¡k¡1;b2) and
¼n([a1]k;[b2]n¡k) > ¼n([a1]k;[b2]n¡k¡1;b1); respectively. If b2 Â b1 held, given that a1 Â a;
these inequalities would contradict the strict submodularity of ¼n: Moreover, if b1 = b2; then
b1 2 La1(b1) holds, and since a1 2 Kb1(a1); we obtain ([a1]k;[b1]n¡k) 2 N(¡) contradicting
that ¡ is symmetric in equilibrium (because a1 Â a Â b Â b1). We conclude that b1 Â b2:
Proof is completed by a straightforward induction argument. k
Since X is compact, there exist convergent subsequences (avm) and (bvm) such that
(avm;bvm) ! (a¤;b¤) 2 X2 as m ! 1. We now claim that (a¤;b¤) 2 N(¡): To see this,
notice that avm 2 Kbvm(avm) implies that
avm 2 B
1([avm]k¡1;[bvm]n¡k) m = 1;2;:::













Moreover, by symmetry of ¡; a¤ 2 Bi([a¤]k¡1;[b¤]n¡k) for all i 2 Ik: Similarly, we can show
that b¤ 2 Bi([a¤]k;[b¤]n¡k¡1) for all i 2 Jk: We thus conclude that (a¤;b¤) 2 N(¡) as is
sought. Therefore, if a Â b held, by Claim 2 there would exist an (a¤;b¤) 2 N(¡) with
a¤ Â b¤; contradicting that ¡ is symmetric in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Remark A. (a) If n = 2; we may drop the hypotheses of convexity of X and quasicon-
cavity of ¼rs from the statement of Lemma A, for then one does not need Kakutani’s …xed
point theorem in proving that (am;bm) is well-de…ned.
(b) Lemma A remains valid if the chain X is any compact convex subset of a locally convex
topological vector space, and ¼rs are continuous with respect to the subspace topology. The
proof of this claim is essentially identical to that of Lemma A, the only major modi…cation
beingthe use of Tychono¤-Fan …xed point theorem(Berge, 1963, p.251) instead of Kakutani’s
theorem in proving Claim 1.
(c) Continuity of ¼r can be weakened in Lemma A to upper semicontinuity of ¼r and lower
semicontinuity of Vr(y) ´ maxa2X ¼r(x¡r;a) for all x¡r 2 Xn¡1: (Given that ¼r is upper
semicontinuous and X is compact, Vr is well-de…ned on Xn¡1:) For, we have used continuity
30of ¼r above only in proving that K¯ (and L®) is nonempty, and that Br has a closed graph.
But upper semicontinuity of ¼r readily guarantees that K¯ is nonempty. To see that Br has
a closed graph under the above hypotheses as well, take any sequence xm in Xn such that
xm ! x¤ as m ! 1; and let xm
r 2 Br(xm
¡r) for all m. If x¤
r = 2 Br(x¤
¡r); then it must be
the case that Vr(x¤
¡r) > ¼r(x¤
¡r;x¤
r): But then using the upper semicontinuity of ¼r; the fact
that xm
r 2 Br(xm





























Proof of Theorem 4. Immediate from Lemma 1 and Lemma A. Q.E.D.
24Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) use an analogous reasoning in proving their Theorem 2.
31References
[1] Alchian, A. (1950): “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory,” Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 58, 211-221.
[2] Berge, C. (1963): Topological Spaces, Macmillan, New York.
[3] Bergstrom, T. C. (1995): “On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings,”
American Economic Review, 85, 58-81.
[4] Birkhoff, G. (1967): Lattice Theory, 3rd ed., Providence: AMS.
[5] Bisin, A., and T. Verdier (1996): “On the Cultural Transmission of Preferences for
Social Status,” mimeo, MIT.
[6] Bolton, G. (1991): “A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence,”
American Economic Review, 81, 1096-1136.
[7] Bulow, J. I., J. D. Geanakoplos and P. D. Klemperer (1985): “Multimarket
Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements,” Journal of Political Economy, 93,
488-511.
[8] Clark A. and A. J. Oswald (1996): “Satisfaction and Comparison of Income,”
Journal of Public Economics, 61, 359-81.
[9] Cole, H, G. J. Mailath and A. Postlewaite (1992): “Social Norms, Savings
Behavior, and Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 100, 1092-125.
[10] Cooper, R. and A. John (1988): “Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian
Models,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 441-463.
[11] Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin (1986): “The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinu-
ous Economic Games I: Theory,” Review of Economic Studies, 53, 1-26.
[12] Diamond, P. (1982): “Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 90, 881-894.
[13] Fershtman, C. and K. L. Judd (1987): “Incentive Equilibrium in Oligopoly,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 77 , 927-40.
[14] Frank, R. H. (1987): Choosing the Right Pond, New York: Oxford University Press.
[15] Friedman, M. (1953): “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in Essays in Posi-
tive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
32[16] Frink, O. (1942): “Topology in Lattices,” Transactions of American Mathematical
Society, 51, 569-582.
[17] Gibbons, R. and K. J. Murphy (1990): “Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief
Executive O¢cers,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 30S-51S.
[18] Holmström, B. (1979): “Moral Hazard and Observability,” Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, 10, 74-91.
[19] Holmström, B. (1982): “Moral Hazard in Teams,” Bell Journal of Economics, 13,
324-40.
[20] Koçkesen, L., E. A. Ok and R. Sethi (1997). “Interdependent Preference Forma-
tion,” C.V. Starr Center working paper 97-18, New York University.
[21] Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990): “Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium
in Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Econometrica, 58, 1255-1277.
[22] Milgrom, P. and C. Shannon (1994): “Monotone Comparative Statics,” Economet-
rica, 62, 157-180.
[23] Nalebuff, B. and J. Stiglitz (1983): “Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General
Theory of Compensation and Competition,” Bell Journal of Economics, August, 21-43.
[24] Nishimura, K. and J. Friedman (1981): “Existence of Nash Equilibriumin n-Person
Games Without Quasi-Concavity,” International Economic Review, 22, 637-648.
[25] Ok, E. A. and L. Koçkesen (1997): “Negatively Interdependent Preferences,” C.V.
Starr Center working paper 97-02, New York University.
[26] Robson, A. J. (1996): “The Evolution of Attitudes to risk: Lottery Tickets, and
Relative Wealth,” Games and Economic Behavior, 14, 190-207.
[27] Rogers, A. R. (1994): “Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection,” American
Economic Review, 84, 460-82.
[28] Shaffer, M. (1989): “Are Pro…t-Maximizers the Best Survivors? A Darwinian Model
of Economic Natural Selection,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 12,
29-45.
[29] Sklivas, S. (1987): “The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 18, 452-458.
33[30] Topkis, D.M. (1978): “Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice,” Operations
Research, 26, 305-321.
[31] Topkis, D.M. (1979): “Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular
Games,” SIAM Journal of Control and Optimization, 26, 305-321.
[32] Vives, X. (1990): “Nash Equilibrium with Strategic Complementarities,” Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 19, 305-321.
[33] Vega-Redondo, F. (1996): Evolution, Games, and Economic Behavior, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
[34] Vickers, J. (1984): “Delegation and the Theory of the Firm,” Economic Journal,
Supplement, 95, 138-147.
34